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標題: 2011年波克夏年報發表了 [打印本頁]
作者: mikeon88    時間: 2012-2-26 06:57     標題: 2011年波克夏年報發表了

2011年波克夏年報發表了
有興趣的同學可以看看

http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2011ar/linksannual11.html
作者: captain    時間: 2012-2-27 21:27

恩..感謝 mike
不過英文不好讀起來很累
就等看看網站出現中文翻譯版再來細細品味

QUOTE:
原帖由 mikeon88 於 2012-2-26 06:57 發表
2011年波克夏年報發表了
有興趣的同學可以看看

http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2011ar/linksannual11.html

作者: mikeon88    時間: 2012-3-4 19:52

2011年波克夏看完了，
比較重要的是底下這一段
老巴指出金價太貴了，
而且不喜歡黃金毫無生產能力，不會生金幣
比較喜歡投資於有產出能力的公司


Investment possibilities are both many and varied. There are three major categories, however, and it’s
important to understand the characteristics of each. So let’s survey the field.
• Investments that are denominated in a given currency include money-market funds, bonds, mortgages,
bank deposits, and other instruments. Most of these currency-based investments are thought of as “safe.”
In truth they are among the most dangerous of assets. Their beta may be zero, but their risk is huge.
Over the past century these instruments have destroyed the purchasing power of investors in many
countries, even as the holders continued to receive timely payments of interest and principal. This ugly
result, moreover, will forever recur. Governments determine the ultimate value of money, and systemic
forces will sometimes cause them to gravitate to policies that produce inflation. From time to time such
policies spin out of control.
Even in the U.S., where the wish for a stable currency is strong, the dollar has fallen a staggering 86%
in value since 1965, when I took over management of Berkshire. It takes no less than $7 today to buy
what $1 did at that time. Consequently, a tax-free institution would have needed 4.3% interest annually
from bond investments over that period to simply maintain its purchasing power. Its managers would
have been kidding themselves if they thought of any portion of that interest as “income.”
17
For tax-paying investors like you and me, the picture has been far worse. During the same 47-year
period, continuous rolling of U.S. Treasury bills produced 5.7% annually. That sounds satisfactory. But
if an individual investor paid personal income taxes at a rate averaging 25%, this 5.7% return would
have yielded nothing in the way of real income. This investor’s visible income tax would have stripped
him of 1.4 points of the stated yield, and the invisible inflation tax would have devoured the remaining
4.3 points. It’s noteworthy that the implicit inflation “tax” was more than triple the explicit income tax
that our investor probably thought of as his main burden. “In God We Trust” may be imprinted on our
currency, but the hand that activates our government’s printing press has been all too human.
High interest rates, of course, can compensate purchasers for the inflation risk they face with currency-based
investments – and indeed, rates in the early 1980s did that job nicely. Current rates, however, do not come
close to offsetting the purchasing-power risk that investors assume. Right now bonds should come with a
warning label.
Under today’s conditions, therefore, I do not like currency-based investments. Even so, Berkshire holds
significant amounts of them, primarily of the short-term variety. At Berkshire the need for ample
liquidity occupies center stage and will never be slighted, however inadequate rates may be.
Accommodating this need, we primarily hold U.S. Treasury bills, the only investment that can be
counted on for liquidity under the most chaotic of economic conditions. Our working level for liquidity
is $20 billion; $10 billion is our absolute minimum.
Beyond the requirements that liquidity and regulators impose on us, we will purchase currency-related
securities only if they offer the possibility of unusual gain – either because a particular credit is
mispriced, as can occur in periodic junk-bond debacles, or because rates rise to a level that offers the
possibility of realizing substantial capital gains on high-grade bonds when rates fall. Though we’ve
exploited both opportunities in the past – and may do so again – we are now 180 degrees removed from
such prospects. Today, a wry comment that Wall Streeter Shelby Cullom Davis made long ago seems
apt: “Bonds promoted as offering risk-free returns are now priced to deliver return-free risk.”
• The second major category of investments involves assets that will never produce anything, but that are
purchased in the buyer’s hope that someone else – who also knows that the assets will be forever
unproductive – will pay more for them in the future. Tulips, of all things, briefly became a favorite of
such buyers in the 17th century.
This type of investment requires an expanding pool of buyers, who, in turn, are enticed because they
believe the buying pool will expand still further. Owners are not inspired by what the asset itself can
produce – it will remain lifeless forever – but rather by the belief that others will desire it even more
avidly in the future.
The major asset in this category is gold, currently a huge favorite of investors who fear almost all other
assets, especially paper money (of whose value, as noted, they are right to be fearful). Gold, however,
has two significant shortcomings, being neither of much use nor procreative. True, gold has some
industrial and decorative utility, but the demand for these purposes is both limited and incapable of
soaking up new production. Meanwhile, if you own one ounce of gold for an eternity, you will still
own one ounce at its end.
What motivates most gold purchasers is their belief that the ranks of the fearful will grow. During the
past decade that belief has proved correct. Beyond that, the rising price has on its own generated
additional buying enthusiasm, attracting purchasers who see the rise as validating an investment thesis.
As “bandwagon” investors join any party, they create their own truth – for a while.
Over the past 15 years, both Internet stocks and houses have demonstrated the extraordinary excesses
that can be created by combining an initially sensible thesis with well-publicized rising prices. In these
bubbles, an army of originally skeptical investors succumbed to the “proof” delivered by the market,
and the pool of buyers – for a time – expanded sufficiently to keep the bandwagon rolling. But bubbles
blown large enough inevitably pop. And then the old proverb is confirmed once again: “What the wise
man does in the beginning, the fool does in the end.”
18
Today the world’s gold stock is about 170,000 metric tons. If all of this gold were melded together, it
would form a cube of about 68 feet per side. (Picture it fitting comfortably within a baseball infield.) At
$1,750 per ounce – gold’s price as I write this – its value would be $9.6 trillion. Call this cube pile A.
Let’s now create a pile B costing an equal amount. For that, we could buy all U.S. cropland (400
million acres with output of about $200 billion annually), plus 16 Exxon Mobils (the world’s most
profitable company, one earning more than $40 billion annually). After these purchases, we would
have about $1 trillion left over for walking-around money (no sense feeling strapped after this buying
binge). Can you imagine an investor with $9.6 trillion selecting pile A over pile B?
Beyond the staggering valuation given the existing stock of gold, current prices make today’s annual
production of gold command about $160 billion. Buyers – whether jewelry and industrial users,
frightened individuals, or speculators – must continually absorb this additional supply to merely
maintain an equilibrium at present prices.
A century from now the 400 million acres of farmland will have produced staggering amounts of corn,
wheat, cotton, and other crops – and will continue to produce that valuable bounty, whatever the
currency may be. Exxon Mobil will probably have delivered trillions of dollars in dividends to its
owners and will also hold assets worth many more trillions (and, remember, you get 16 Exxons). The
170,000 tons of gold will be unchanged in size and still incapable of producing anything. You can
fondle the cube, but it will not respond.
Admittedly, when people a century from now are fearful, it’s likely many will still rush to gold. I’m
confident, however, that the $9.6 trillion current valuation of pile A will compound over the century at
a rate far inferior to that achieved by pile B.
• Our first two categories enjoy maximum popularity at peaks of fear: Terror over economic collapse
drives individuals to currency-based assets, most particularly U.S. obligations, and fear of currency
collapse fosters movement to sterile assets such as gold. We heard “cash is king” in late 2008, just
when cash should have been deployed rather than held. Similarly, we heard “cash is trash” in the early
1980s just when fixed-dollar investments were at their most attractive level in memory. On those
occasions, investors who required a supportive crowd paid dearly for that comfort.
My own preference – and you knew this was coming – is our third category: investment in productive
assets, whether businesses, farms, or real estate. Ideally, these assets should have the ability in
inflationary times to deliver output that will retain its purchasing-power value while requiring a
minimum of new capital investment. Farms, real estate, and many businesses such as Coca-Cola, IBM
and our own See’s Candy meet that double-barreled test. Certain other companies – think of our
regulated utilities, for example – fail it because inflation places heavy capital requirements on them. To
earn more, their owners must invest more. Even so, these investments will remain superior to
nonproductive or currency-based assets.
Whether the currency a century from now is based on gold, seashells, shark teeth, or a piece of paper
(as today), people will be willing to exchange a couple of minutes of their daily labor for a Coca-Cola
or some See’s peanut brittle. In the future the U.S. population will move more goods, consume more
food, and require more living space than it does now. People will forever exchange what they produce
for what others produce.
Our country’s businesses will continue to efficiently deliver goods and services wanted by our citizens.
Metaphorically, these commercial “cows” will live for centuries and give ever greater quantities of “milk”
to boot. Their value will be determined not by the medium of exchange but rather by their capacity to
deliver milk. Proceeds from the sale of the milk will compound for the owners of the cows, just as they
did during the 20th century when the Dow increased from 66 to 11,497 (and paid loads of dividends as
well). Berkshire’s goal will be to increase its ownership of first-class businesses. Our first choice will be
to own them in their entirety – but we will also be owners by way of holding sizable amounts of
marketable stocks. I believe that over any extended period of time this category of investing will prove to
be the runaway winner among the three we’ve examined. More important, it will be by far the safest.
作者: mikeon88    時間: 2012-3-5 14:40

From:  Perry_Kuo
Sent: Monday, March 05, 2012 12:23 PM

Dear Mikeon 桑,
請教一下 --
波克夏 2011 年報提到 Intrinsic Business Value 的描述如下.

Intrinsic Business Value
Charlie and I measure our performance by the rate of gain in Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic business value. If our gain over time outstrips the performance of the S&P 500, we have earned our paychecks. If it doesn’t, we are overpaid at any price.
We have no way to pinpoint intrinsic value. But we do have a useful, though considerably understated, proxy for it: per-share book value. This yardstick is meaningless at most companies. At Berkshire, however, book value very roughly tracks business values. That’s because the amount by which Berkshire’s intrinsic value exceeds book value does not swing wildly from year to year, though it increases in most years. Over time, the divergence will likely become ever more substantial in absolute terms, remaining reasonably steady, however, on a percentage basis as both the numerator and denominator of the business-value/book-value equation increase.

Intrinsic Business Value 是 Intrinsic Value 嗎?

作者: mikeon88    時間: 2012-3-6 08:04

From: Perry_Kuo
Sent: Tuesday, March 06, 2012 7:44 AM
Subject: 波克夏 2011 年報 9/105 頁
Dear Mikeon 桑, 請教一下 --
波克夏 2011 年報 9/105 頁.
IBM買回庫藏股的例子,其他數據我算了一下沒問題.
但是最後一個數據(紅字部分),$1 1/2 billion 是怎麼算出來的呢?
謝謝.
Best Regards
Perry

Let’s use IBM as an example. As all business observers know, CEOs Lou Gerstner and Sam Palmisanodid a superb job in moving IBM from near-bankruptcy twenty years ago to its prominence today. Theiroperational accomplishments were truly extraordinary.
But their financial management was equally brilliant, particularly in recent years as the company’s
financial flexibility improved. Indeed, I can think of no major company that has had better financial management, askill that has materially increased the gains enjoyed by IBM shareholders. The company has used debt wisely, madevalue-adding acquisitions almost exclusively for cash and aggressively repurchased its own stock.Today, IBM has 1.16 billion shares outstanding, of which we own about 63.9 million or 5.5%.Naturally, what happens to the company’s earnings over the next five years is of enormous importance to us.Beyond that, the company will likely spend $50 billion or so in those years to repurchase shares. Our quiz for theday: What should a long-term shareholder, such as Berkshire, cheer for during that period?
I won’t keep you in suspense. We should wish for IBM’s stock price to languish throughout the five years.Let’s do the math. If IBM’s stock price averages, say, $200 during the period, the company will acquire250 million shares for its $50 billion. There would consequently be 910 million shares outstanding, and wewould own about 7% of the company. If the stock conversely sells for an average of $300 during the five-yearperiod, IBM will acquire only 167 million shares. That would leave about 990 million shares outstanding afterfive years, of which we would own 6.5%.
If IBM were to earn, say, $20 billion in the fifth year, our share of those earnings would be a full $100million greater under the “disappointing” scenario of a lower stock price than they would have been at the higherprice. At some later point our shares would be worth perhaps $11⁄2 billion more than if the “high-price”repurchase scenario had taken place.
作者: mikeon88    時間: 2012-3-6 08:05

拍謝，我未仔細去推敲數字怎麼出來的
我看東西都用瞄的，觀念懂了就pass過去


CNBC的記者曾訪問巴菲特關於IBM買回庫藏股

http://www.cnbc.com/id/46546992

BECKY: We are back with Warren Buffett this morning. We've got a last few minutes of questions before we are finished up here. And, Warren, Jim Cramer was just making some comments about your view on stock buybacks, especially regarding IBM. You now own about 5 1/2 percent of the stock of the shares outstanding for that company and in your annual letter you laid out your cause for why you would be happy to see them buying back stock and you're not necessarily looking for that stock to go up over the last few years. That's a little controversial. You want to lay it out?

BUFFETT: Well, I don't know whether it's going to go up or not.

BECKY: Yeah.

BUFFETT: I'm just saying that if they're going to buy back stock, they're going to buy back a lot of stock, they've announced they're going to do that. If they buy it cheaper and I'm a continuing shareholder, I'm better off. I mean, if three people own a McDonald's stand and you can buy out a — one of the three for a fifth of the total value of it, the other two are better off at the end. And any time you — any time you buy your partner out at a discount, you benefit. Now there's no moral problem attached to that in the stock market because markets set prices, you wouldn't want to do that in a private partnership.

作者: Chuan    時間: 2012-3-6 11:27

有中文版了
http://alberthungblog.blogspot.com/2012/02/2012.html

可以參考...

正在閱讀中
作者: polyperry    時間: 2012-3-6 12:12

翻譯有些地方有錯...底下是一個例子...


英文(7/105):
Three large and very attractive fixed-income investments were called away from us by their issuers in
2011. Swiss Re, Goldman Sachs and General Electric paid us an aggregate of $12.8 billion to redeem
securities that were producing about $1.2 billion of pre-tax earnings for Berkshire. That’s a lot of
income to replace, though our Lubrizol purchase did offset most of it.

中文:
另外有三個很大且非常具有吸引力的固定收益債券投資被發行人給贖回。Swiss Re、高盛以及通用電氣付給我們128億贖回了可讓我們賺了12億的稅前盈餘的債券，我們買了Lubrizol也僅能補回部份的利益。
作者: polyperry    時間: 2012-3-6 13:00

接續#8

英文(5/105):
On September 16th we acquired Lubrizol, a worldwide producer of additives and other specialty
chemicals. The company has had an outstanding record since James Hambrick became CEO in 2004,
with pre-tax profits increasing from $147 million to $1,085 million. Lubrizol will have many
opportunities for “bolt-on” acquisitions in the specialty chemical field. Indeed, we’ve already agreed to
three, costing $493 million. James is a disciplined buyer and a superb operator. Charlie and I are eager
to expand his managerial domain.

1085m=1.085b~1.2b
作者: chris    時間: 2012-3-6 13:19



QUOTE:
原帖由 <i>mikeon88</i> 於 2012-3-6 08:04 發表<br />
From: Perry_Kuo<br />
Sent: Tuesday, March 06, 2012 7:44 AM<br />
Subject: 波克夏 2011 年報 9/105 頁<br />
Dear Mikeon 桑, 請教一下 --<br />
波克夏 2011 年報 9/105 頁.<br />
IBM買回庫藏股的例子,其他數據我算了一下沒問題.<br />
...

<br />
10 million是低價買入比高價買入後，分的的earnings的差異，1.5billion是股價差。本益比設定12。
很有趣的題目，languish， 嗯，good word！！
作者: polyperry    時間: 2012-3-6 15:28

Dear Chris,
謝謝.


我的算法如下,有錯請指正.

200 買入 IBM,Berkshire 擁有7%.
股價1=12*EPS1=12*(20b*7%/63.9m)

300 買入 IBM,Berkshire 擁有6.5%.
股價2=12*EPS2=12*(20b*6.5%/63.9m)

價差=(股價1-股價2)*63.9m=12*(20b*7%-20b*6.5%)=12*20b*0.5%=1.2b<1.5b

略小於年報的值...
作者: chris    時間: 2012-3-6 18:07



QUOTE:
原帖由 &lt;i&gt;polyperry&lt;/i&gt; 於 2012-3-6 15:28 發表&lt;br /&gt;<br />
Dear Chris,&lt;br /&gt;<br />
謝謝.&lt;br /&gt;<br />
&lt;img src="http://user.freebbs.tw/mikeon88/images/01.gif" smilieid="1" border="0" alt="" /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;<br />
&lt;br /&gt;<br />
我的算法如下,有錯請指正.&lt;br /&gt;<br />
&lt;br /&gt;<br />
200 買入 IBM,Berkshire 擁有7%.&lt;br /&gt;<br />
股價1=12*EPS1=12*(20b*7%/63.9m)&lt;br /&gt;<br />
&lt;br /&gt;<br />
300 買入 IBM,Berkshire 擁有6.5%.&lt;br /&gt;<br />
股價2=12*EPS2=12*(20b*6.5%/63.9m)&lt;br /&gt;<br />
  ...

&lt;br /&gt;<br />
不是，你的想法不對，你這樣算就直接把100million x 12不就好了！！<br />
在想一想，你就會了！！
P=earning/share*PE ratio
Notice your calculation of earning per share.

[ 本帖最後由 chris 於 2012-3-6 18:19 編輯 ]
作者: chris    時間: 2012-3-6 18:10

其實這在finance的書裡，dividend policy寫了很多，很有趣的章節，個人很喜歡這方面的思考。
作者: chris    時間: 2012-3-6 18:47



QUOTE:
原帖由 <i>chris</i> 於 2012-3-6 18:07 發表<br />
&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;<br />
不是，你的想法不對，你這樣算就直接把100million x 12不就好了！！&lt;br /&gt;<br />
在想一想，你就會了！！<br />
P=earning/share*PE ratio<br />
Notice your calculation of earning ...

<br />

抱歉，沒有仔細看，你的方式也是對的，只是沒有很細。其實就是100million* PEratio
我的做法是。(20b\910m-20b\990million)*12*63.9million
跟你的意思是一樣的，也是大約等於100million*12
我的得到是約13.5billion，所以老巴可能設定PE ratio是15吧？？
作者: polyperry    時間: 2012-3-6 19:07

Chris 桑,多謝你的指導.
作者: chris    時間: 2012-3-6 19:40



QUOTE:
原帖由 <i>chris</i> 於 2012-3-6 18:47 發表<br />
&lt;br /&gt;<br />
<br />
抱歉，沒有仔細看，你的方式也是對的，只是沒有很細。其實就是100million* PEratio<br />
我的做法是。(20b\910m-20b\990million)*12*63.9million<br />
跟你的意思是一樣的，也是大約等於100million*12<br />
...

<br />

抱歉，1.35billion
作者: mikeon88    時間: 2012-3-6 19:55

From: Perry Kuo
Sent: Tuesday, March 06, 2012 7:37 PM
Subject: 看來巴菲特真的有盈再表.

Dear Mikeon 桑,
看來巴菲特真的有盈再表.

盈再表跑出來的 IBM 的"現在 PER"=15(see attachment).

200 買入 IBM,Berkshire 擁有7%.
股價1=15*EPS1=15*(20b*7%/63.9m)

300 買入 IBM,Berkshire 擁有6.5%.
股價2=15*EPS2=15*(20b*6.5%/63.9m)

價差=(股價1-股價2)*63.9m=15*(20b*7%-20b*6.5%)=15*20b*0.5%=1.5b


剛好等於年報上的值.
^_^

PS.Chris 桑,很厲害,一下就知道年報上如何算.


Best Regards
Perry


Let’s use IBM as an example. As all business observers know, CEOs Lou Gerstner and Sam Palmisanodid a superb job in moving IBM from near-bankruptcy twenty years ago to its prominence today. Theiroperational accomplishments were truly extraordinary.
But their financial management was equally brilliant, particularly in recent years as the company’s
financial flexibility improved. Indeed, I can think of no major company that has had better financial management, askill that has materially increased the gains enjoyed by IBM shareholders. The company has used debt wisely, madevalue-adding acquisitions almost exclusively for cash and aggressively repurchased its own stock.Today, IBM has 1.16 billion shares outstanding, of which we own about 63.9 million or 5.5%.Naturally, what happens to the company’s earnings over the next five years is of enormous importance to us.Beyond that, the company will likely spend $50 billion or so in those years to repurchase shares. Our quiz for theday: What should a long-term shareholder, such as Berkshire, cheer for during that period?
I won’t keep you in suspense. We should wish for IBM’s stock price to languish throughout the five years.Let’s do the math. If IBM’s stock price averages, say, $200 during the period, the company will acquire250 million shares for its $50 billion. There would consequently be 910 million shares outstanding, and wewould own about 7% of the company. If the stock conversely sells for an average of $300 during the five-yearperiod, IBM will acquire only 167 million shares. That would leave about 990 million shares outstanding afterfive years, of which we would own 6.5%.
If IBM were to earn, say, $20 billion in the fifth year, our share of those earnings would be a full $100million greater under the “disappointing” scenario of a lower stock price than they would have been at the higher[size=+0]price. At some later point our shares would be worth perhaps $11⁄2 billion more than if the “high-price”repurchase scenario had taken place.



.
國際商業機器公司   (NYSE:IBM)：電腦業-整合系統Down 0.11% N建議
IBM還原$ROE%4盈再%常利$mYoY%EPS$股息$拆股
2007/12211.6 10,400 -7.5 1.50 1:1股價$200.7
2008/12210.1 43 12,308 18 9.2 1.90 1:1預期報酬32%
2009/12208.2 101 13,420 9 10.3 2.15 1:1俗$571.1
2010/12206.1 66 14,833 11 12.1 2.50 1:1報酬%15%
2011/12203.6 69 (25)15,855 7 13.6 2.90 1:1貴$1,667.5
2012F200.7 79 (5)15,855 0 13.6 0.00 1:1報酬%0%
200.66 75 72…平均ROE現在PER15
最終PER12
預期配息57%
作者: mikeon88    時間: 2012-3-6 19:57

我早就知道花輪有在按盈再表了


Chirs桑今年台北同學會要來演講，一定很精彩


作者: mikeon88    時間: 2012-3-6 20:02

From: Perry Kuo
Sent: Tuesday, March 06, 2012 7:54 PM

Chris 桑要演講! 那我要快快安排,能聽 Chris 桑分享經驗真得太好了.
^_^

作者: polyperry    時間: 2012-3-6 21:49

剛又重新整理一次,發現底下算法更快.

當 PER 都相同等於15時,
PER=(Price1-Price2)/(EPS1-EPS2)=((Price1-Price2)*63.9m)/((EPS1-EPS2)*63.9m)
15=價差/100m
價差=1500m=1.5b
作者: mchi    時間: 2012-3-7 08:43



QUOTE:
原帖由 polyperry 於 2012-3-6 12:12 發表
翻譯有些地方有錯...底下是一個例子...


英文(7/105):
Three large and very attractive fixed-income investments were called away from us by their issuers in
2011. Swiss Re, Goldman Sachs an ...

請問一下, 這句話是那裡翻了不對, 少了個"大"嗎??
作者: captain    時間: 2012-3-7 09:32

巴爺爺就是巴爺爺...
======================

科技股領漲 IBM衝200美元新高
　美股這波多頭行情已邁入第4年，科技類股扮演衝鋒要角，標普500指數電腦相關類股今年迄今累計已大漲15％，漲幅是大盤的近2倍。老字號科技大廠國際商業機器（IBM）挾著傲人的基本面股價連連衝高，周一並一舉收上200美元大關，創歷史新高價。
　美股這波牛市行情始自2009年3月9日，標普500指數繼2009與2010年連續2年大漲後，2011年漲勢出現停滯，但今年在科技股帶頭闖關下，大盤漲勢再起。
　標普500指數今年來漲幅已達8.5％，電腦相關類股更是飆高15％，漲幅高居10大類股之冠。科技股為主的那斯達克指數今年迄今漲幅也逾13％。
　美股周一因全球經濟成長前景出現疑慮而下跌，3大指數全面收黑，短線漲幅較大的科技類股也同步拉回整理。
　不過，「深藍巨人」IBM逆勢上漲，收盤報200.66美元，大漲近1％，首度收上200美元大關，改寫歷史新高價。IBM大漲是道瓊工指尾盤僅小跌0.1％的主因，IBM為道指30檔成份股中權值最重的個股，占大盤權值比率高達12％。
　IBM是老字號的科技大廠，公司已有100年的歷史，近年來儘管市場焦點都擺在蘋果與Google等後起的科技新秀，IBM的本業經營也同樣出色。
　有業績撐腰，股價也沒有委屈的理由，IBM過去3年來總計狂飆140％，過去1年大漲近24％，今年迄今漲幅也超過9％，股價表現遠優於大盤。
　IBM元月公布年報，2011年全年營收高達1,070億美元，每股盈餘達13.06美元，2012年獲利預測目標也擊敗市場分析師預期。
作者: polyperry    時間: 2012-3-7 12:59

mchi 桑,
底下是我認為錯誤的地方.
如果誤會原意,還請指正.


英文(7/105):
Three large and very attractive fixed-income investments were called away from us by their issuers in
2011. Swiss Re, Goldman Sachs and General Electric paid us an aggregate of $12.8 billion to redeem
securities that were producing about $1.2 billion of pre-tax earnings for Berkshire. That’s a lot of
income to replace, though our Lubrizol purchase did offset most of it.

中文:
另外有三個很大且非常具有吸引力的固定收益債券投資被發行人給贖回。Swiss Re、高盛以及通用電氣付給我們128億贖回了可讓我們賺了12億的稅前盈餘的債券，我們買了Lubrizol也僅能補回部份的利益。

參考:
英文(5/105):
On September 16th we acquired Lubrizol, a worldwide producer of additives and other specialty
chemicals. The company has had an outstanding record since James Hambrick became CEO in 2004,
with pre-tax profits increasing from $147 million to $1,085 million. Lubrizol will have many
opportunities for “bolt-on” acquisitions in the specialty chemical field. Indeed, we’ve already agreed to
three, costing $493 million. James is a disciplined buyer and a superb operator. Charlie and I are eager
to expand his managerial domain.

1085m=1.085b~1.2b
其實 Lubrizol 的 pre-tax profit 補回90%(=1.085/1.2).非補回部分的利益.
作者: polyperry    時間: 2012-3-7 13:15

翻譯成這樣會不會好一些.


That’s a lot of income to replace, though our Lubrizol purchase did offset most of it.

這是一項不少的收入(需要尋求)替代,雖然我們所收購的 Lubrizol 彌補了大部分(但仍有少部分未補足).

[ 本帖最後由 polyperry 於 2012-3-7 13:19 編輯 ]
作者: polyperry    時間: 2012-3-7 19:01

說明一下,很謝謝有中文版的年報,原文版看不懂時,我也會參考.
列出的疑問,只是我個人看到的一部份問題,大家一起討論.


英文(15/105):
Please understand, however, that Charlie and I are neither masochists nor Pollyannas. If either of the
failings we set forth in Rule 11 is present – if the business will likely be a cash drain over the longer term, or if labor
strife is endemic – we will take prompt and decisive action. Such a situation has happened only a couple of times in
our 47-year history, and none of the businesses we now own is in straits requiring us to consider disposing of it.

中文:
請理解查理跟我都不是受虐狂，也不是過度樂觀，在我們設定的第11條規定，如果企業是長期帶來現金流失，或是勞工紛爭持續盛行，我們將採取快速且果斷的行動，這樣的情況在過去47年的歷史當中只有發生過2次，而目前我們持有的企業並沒有需要這樣做的。

a couple of times=several times=幾(數)次.
作者: polyperry    時間: 2012-3-7 19:09

英文(12/105):
Measured by ton-miles, rail moves 42% of America’s inter-city freight, and BNSF moves more than
any other railroad – about 37% of the industry total.

中文:
以每噸/哩去計算，鐵路佔了美國城市間大42%的運量，而BNSF則勝過其他鐵路，佔有37%總行業的運量。

ton-mile (tnml)
n.
A unit of freight transportation equivalent to a ton of freight moved one mile.

[舉例]:
10 tons 貨物移動 10 miles.
等於 10 tons*10 miles=100 ton-miles
但等於 10 tons/10 miles=1 ton/mile
工程上,一個是總量的概念,另一個是平均的概念.
作者: polyperry    時間: 2012-3-7 19:19

英文(12/105):
To fulfill its societal obligation, BNSF regularly invests far more than its depreciation charge, with the
excess amounting to $1.8 billion in 2011.

中文:
為了屢行這些社會義務，BNSF定期投入比折舊費用更多的的金額，2011年是超過18億元。

翻譯成:
過量的金額達到18億美元.
應該好一些.

因為 amounting to 是達到的意思.
作者: mikeon88    時間: 2012-3-14 16:02

From: Perry
Sent: Wednesday, March 14, 2012 1:47 PM

Dear Mikeon 桑,

請教一下 --
Mikeon 桑上課時,提到 Float(浮存金) 的好處.
浮存金定義:Float=保費收入(營業收入)-各項準備金-經營成本-經營費用

2011 Annual Report 中,談到保險事業除了浮存金還提到 Underwriting Profit(see attachment).
Underwriting Profit 的定義又是什麼呢?

謝謝指導.
Best Regards
作者: mikeon88    時間: 2012-3-14 16:03

承保利益
作者: mikeon88    時間: 2012-3-14 19:42

From: Perry
Sent: Wednesday, March 14, 2012 7:07 PM

Dear Mikeon 桑,
查了一下承保利益(Underwriting Profit),結果如下:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Underwriting_profit


問題:
(1)所以就保險業來說,承保利益就是(損益表的)營業利益嗎?
(2)就保險業來說,如果承保利益=營業利益=營業收入-營業成本-營業費用,所以可得到結論:營業利益-浮存金=各項準備金,是否正確?

謝謝指導.
Best Regards
作者: mikeon88    時間: 2012-3-14 19:43

應該不只，還有其它
拍謝，我不曾是金融股研究員
無法回答



作者: polyperry    時間: 2012-3-14 19:55

請教一下各位同學,
保險業的 Underwriting Profit(承保利益) 寫成數學式(ex.承保利益=保費收入-...)應該怎麼寫呢?
謝謝.
作者: polyperry    時間: 2012-3-17 20:31

有一些2011年報翻譯上的討論,有興趣的可以參考一下.


http://blog.sina.com.tw/appleibook/article.php?pbgid=234&entryid=621876&comopen=1
作者: SimonYang    時間: 2012-3-21 08:42     標題: 就是保險＂本業＂的獲利



QUOTE:
原帖由 mikeon88 於 2012-3-14 16:03 發表
承保利益

壽險業指的是＂死差益＂ 就是實際死亡率低於＂經驗生命表＂的預期死亡率所產生的核保利益
產險業指的是實際損失率低於預期損失率所帶來的承保利益
作者: polyperry    時間: 2012-3-21 19:50

先謝謝 Simon 同學.

還有一些疑問,還請幫忙解答.

保險業的獲利來源可分為:利差益,死差益,費差益.
問題:
(1)當實際投資報酬率>預定利率時產生利差益,但因利差益涉及到"投資".所以是不是保險業的 Underwriting Profit 都不算利差益?

(2)壽險業的 Underwriting Profit 是等於死差益?還是死差益-營業費用?會這樣問是因為底下的 website 提及 Underwriting Profit 須扣除營業費用.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Underwriting_profit

(3)產險業的 Underwriting Profit 是由費差益產生嗎?同(2)題,產險業的 Underwriting Profit=費差益 or 費差益-營業費用?

問題有些多,還請幫忙解答.
作者: SimonYang    時間: 2012-4-10 13:34     標題: Underwritting Profit

1.  Underwritting Profit＝核保利益
    A.  不論產壽險 都是因為核保嚴謹, 挑選好業務 淘汰不良業務, 實際損失率低於預期損失率（通常為同業平均值）所產生的利益, 算是一種超額利潤.
    B.  在費率結構中 保費被分為兩大塊: 純保費及附加保費, 純保費就是預期損失, 拿來付賠款的.  附加保費則包含費用（佣金 手續費 行政費用）＋特別準備金（3％左右）＋預期利潤, 附加保費約佔總保費35％左右, 政策性強制保險如強制汽車責任險及住宅地震險為公辦民營性質, 保費中沒有預期利潤, So 保費相對較低.
    C.  核保利益通常被視為超額利潤, 與＂利差益＂無關.

2.  產險業多屬一年以下短期保險, 計算保費時不必以＂預定利率＂折現, 因此沒有利差益或利差損的問題,  才可能產生零成本的浮存金（國內會計科目為＂各項準備金＂,  列在負債項下）.  看看國壽 新壽及國華等老牌壽險公司 十幾年前以6％-8％預定利率大賣的長期保單, 造成今天鉅額利差損的慘況. 可以体會巴老捨壽險就產險思惟.

3.  壽險業的Underwritting Profit  在死亡保險就叫死差益, 營業費用已在附加費用中另收.

4.  產險業的Underwritting Prifit 純指實際損失率低於預期損失的利潤, 如果你以超額的銷貨毛利觀點來看, 當然必需扣掉費用才叫淨利.  或是美國會計制度不同？ 沒深入研究

Sorry！ 忘了訂閱本站文章, 今天逛進來才見您的留言, 抱歉！
作者: SimonYang    時間: 2012-4-10 15:16     標題: 有關Float 的一些說明

剛逛了一下同學們的討論文章, 發現多半對巴老所謂的Float有錯誤的解讀, 願就個人在產險業多年的經驗, 提出業界觀點供大家參考:

1. Float 應該是一種＂預備金＂ 的概念, 指的是保費收進來後, 在賠出去之前的閒置資金, 在保險尚未到期之前, 理論上仍屬保戶所有（他可以隨時解約 領回未到期保費）, 保險公司可以用這筆錢 在法令規範下去投資或放貸, 創造收益.  並非保費扣掉理賠後的剩餘.  在國內以＂未滿期保費準備＂  ＂賠款準備＂ ＂責任準備＂ ＂特別準備金＂ 等會計科目, 列在負債項下, 統稱＂各項準備金＂.  查一下國內壽險龍頭國壽的財報, 你會發現其自有資本率不到3％,  就因準備金屬負債.
    這可以從巴老2012給股東的信中看出來:  2011年BH Re（波克夏再保公司）出現了負714M的 Underwritting Profit, 但同時卻擁有高達33,728M的 Float,  其實保險公司主要的獲利來源並非保險本業, 而是鉅額 Float 的投資收入,  所以巴老會嘲笑美國市佔最高的州農保險公司（State Farm） ＂在過去11年中有8年出現虧損＂, 因其削價競爭 本業虧損, 又無法靠投資獲利賺回來.

2.  BH Re及 General Re 之所以能累積鉅額準備金, 實因這兩家都是世界級的再保公司,  是全球各保險公司所有巨災風險的最終承受者, 胳膊一定要夠粗才行, 美國光是 911 及卡崔納兩次巨災, 就倒了幾十家保險及再保公司！  而 Geico 也是全美市佔近10％的大型汽車保險業者.

3.  巨額保險為賣方市場, 國際級的再保公司擁有訂價權,  國內大型企業如中油 台塑 台積電 中鋼的火災及各項保險, 都得先洽再保公司同意承保後, 再依其報價加成, 才敢出單承保,  所以再保公司沒有削價競爭的問題.  但即便享有此一優勢, BH Re 在去年保險本業仍出現7.14億美金的虧損.






float
作者: mikeon88    時間: 2012-4-10 16:01

Simon桑是高手啊 !
今年 9 月同學會能否來為我們演講一場 ?
很期待吶
謝謝
作者: SimonYang    時間: 2012-4-10 20:34

在產險業混了35年退休, 對此行業特性比較了解而已. 被稱高手會臉紅的！
作者: mikeon88    時間: 2012-4-10 21:15

Simon桑，
來同學會跟我們聊一聊35年的經驗吧 !
作者: polyperry    時間: 2012-4-10 21:27

多謝 Simon 桑詳細的解說,我好好咀嚼咀嚼.
以後有問題,還請 Simon 桑費心指導.
真是太感謝了.
作者: pouiiu    時間: 2012-4-11 21:57

Simon 桑如何 看台產
http://mikeon88.freebbs.tw/viewthread.php?tid=844&extra=&page=1
作者: Tony0513    時間: 2012-4-12 08:03

+1^^

Simon桑，
來同學會跟我們聊一聊35年的經驗吧 !
作者: SimonYang    時間: 2012-4-12 08:48

1.  台產和台壽保都是原省營事業民營化  釋股時由營建公司拿下經營權的, 目前官股股權已降到30％以下.  官營時代超保守的投資策略 （幾乎只買債券和不動產）, 為兩家公司打下超低的風險基礎, 如台壽保就靠出售債券和賣樓, 在利率狂降, 壽險業叫苦連天時 仍以超高eps稱霸業界. 母公司龍邦母以子貴,靠台壽保股息就吃的肥滋滋, 甘脆連營建本業都丟掉, 早就不堆案了, 如今 祖產賣光股價馬上打回原形.

2.  台產相對比較穩重, 將祖產土地拿來開發而非出售, 如台北館前路那一大塊土地都更的整合成功, 羨煞一堆營建公司 .  但在保險本業上卻承襲官營時代的保守做風, 沒利潤的絕對不碰, 不會為衝營收而殺價搶單. 這點倒符合巴老對Geico的讚賞.

3.  台產的領航集團知名度不高, 在投資上卻具有營建業特有的衝勁,  常與德安  美麗華  美亞鋼管等共同出手,  前一陣子鬧很大的台東美麗灣酒店就是他們的傑作,  有辦法拿下海岸線BOT案, 又敢在抗爭中繼續施工, ----這是較令人擔心的部份.

4.  同學們如對產險業有興趣, 我可以在同學會上（台中場） 對旺旺友聯. 第一保. 台產. 新光產 做粗淺的分享,  當然得Michoel桑點頭才成！
作者: mikeon88    時間: 2012-4-12 08:53

太好了
歡迎Simon桑來台中同學會演講
作者: polyperry    時間: 2012-4-12 23:49

請教 Simon 桑,
所以產險業的 Underwriting Profit 就叫費差益是嗎?
還請指導,謝謝.


#36
4.產險業的 Underwriting Profit 純指實際損失率低於預期損失的利潤.
作者: polyperry    時間: 2012-4-27 07:51

請教 Simon 桑,
所以產險業的 Underwriting Profit 就叫費差益是嗎?
還請指導,謝謝.


#36
4.產險業的 Underwriting Profit 純指實際損失率低於預期損失的利潤.
作者: SimonYang    時間: 2012-5-9 07:59

這樣解釋大家可能比較容易明暸:

1.  壽險保單常一保數十年, 計算保費時需考慮利率因素, 以幾十年後的預期賠款折現成繳費期間每期應繳保費, 因國內業者習慣以平準保費來設計保單（就是每年保費相同 不會因年齡而逐年調高保費）, 提存的準備金較多,   保費受預訂利率的影響很大,   公司盈虧也因投資績效高或低於預訂利率而產生利差益或利差損.    而產險多為一次繳費的一年期保單, 保費計算不考慮利率問題, 也就沒有利差益或利差損的問題 ---只有產險業才有零成本的＂浮存金＂, 壽險業的資金成本其實比你我都高！

2.  死差益也是壽險業的專利--- 其死亡保費是以壽險業的經驗生命表來計算, 只要你承保的實際死亡率低於預期死亡率, 就會產生死差益, 產險業沒有死差益, 只有＂核保利益＂.  

3.  產險也沒有＂費差益＂的說法, 雖然和壽險業一樣都有實際費用率高或低於預期費用率的費差益或費差損, 實務上卻沒人用這種說法

4.  金管會將於七月起調降責任準備金預定利率, 各壽險公司已開始狂炒＂停售＂議題,  強銷即將漲價的舊保單.  要不要趁漲價前購買？  大家不妨討論一下.
作者: mikeon88    時間: 2012-5-9 08:07

感謝Simon桑指導
今年台中同學會一定受益良多
作者: polyperry    時間: 2012-5-10 07:39

多謝 SimonYang 桑費心說明,再次感謝.




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